117.oldal

 A "cikksorozat" további folytatását a választásokig szüneteltetem, mert nem célom, hogy bárki politikai céljai érdekében  használja fel.Köszönöm megértésüket!

 

Ez az Európai Bizottság Jogi Szolgálata által kért kiegészítő tények III. és egyben befejező fejezete. Az előző oldalon olvasható angolul  a Bevezető rész és az I. és II. fejezet. Azért kellett angolra fordítani ezt a beadványt, mert nem tudni, mit manipuláltak a magyar szöveggel, hogy elfedjék a lényeget. Sokat mondó, hogy teljesen azonos szisztémával, mintha egyeztettek volna  a magyar érintettekkel, egyszerűen elhallgatták a legsúlyosabb jogsértések tényét, azt, hogy a közösségi versenyjogot koholt vádak alapján, bizonyítás nélkül alkalmazták,majd a védekezéshez való jogot  undorító módon megtagták,ami nem csak jogilag, de  emberileg is a legaljasabb, amit el lehet követni.A bolsevik ávós és más  mindenféle  eszement  szélsőség módszere a védekezéshez való jogtól való megfosztás, ami a koholt vádat önmagában bizonyítja! Mi volt az a kiemelkedően  nagy  érdek,ami ezt az aljas  eljárást indokolta? Végül csak megtudjuk, hogy ki állt ezen aljas eljárás mögött, ki volt az a  "kutyafejű nagyúr" aki ezt az egész eljárást szervezte?  Hogyan fordulhat elő egy jogállamnak nevezett országban, hogy azt is következmények nélkül meg lehet tenni, hogy az Alkotmánybíróságon egy olyan professzortársa bízzák az alkotmányt és minden törvényt sértő ítéletek, köztük az alapul szolgáló koholt ítélet  "alkotmányossági" felülvizsgálatát, akit  több évtizedes kollegiális kapcsolatban állt a koholt ítélet meghozóival?  Sajnos az öt fős "tanács" tagjainak az ügyben  tett írásbeli véleménye nem nyilvános, pedig érdemes lenne megtekinteni, miként sikálták el végül  két alkotmánybírósági határozattal is ellentétesen az ügyet, és a vajon milyen érv szólt amellett, hogy a koholt vád mellett még az únió joga által megkövetelt és az alkotmánybírókra is kötelező hatályú bizonyítási kötelezettség elmulasztásával  és a védekezési jog (ami alapvető alkotmányos jog) megtagadásával is azonosultak. Most bebizonyosodott, hogy a haveri kapcsolatok felülírják a törvényeket, az alkotmányt, az Unió jogát, a nagy alázattal letett esküjüket, azaz mindent.

El lehet gondolkodni rajta, hogy ha egyszer ezt meg lehetett tenni, akkor akárhányszor meg lehet tenni, és ha akárhányszor meg lehet tenni, akkor hol van a jogállami biztosíték? Hol van a fékek és ellensúlyok sokat emlegetett rendszere?

CHAPTER III

TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

The case of mandatory obligation to initiate preliminary ruling

(THE HUNGARIAN COURTS OMITTED TO INFORM THE COMMISSION AND TO REFER THE CASE TO PRELIMINARY RULING IN ORDER TO VEIL THEIR CONSPICUOUS INFRINGEMENTS FROM THE BODIES OF THE UNION.)

Complainant deems necessary to draw the attention of the Legal Service to the fact that the value in dispute in this case was EUR 10 million, as determined in the first arbitration proceedings.

Also with regard to the value in dispute this case should also be analysed objectively, since the infringements are conspicuous to such a degree that in the event of identification therewith may harm even the reputation of the Union.

Both the facts and the legal situation are unambiguous to such a degree that e.g. refusal of the obligation to evidence and of the right to defence, i.e. infringement of fundamental requirements of the EU competition law do not require any special proceedings.

It may be presumed that the court of the Member State judging at the highest instance did not make use of the possibility to refer the case to preliminary ruling or, in the opinion of Complainant it did not meet the obligation thereof, for two reasons:

1. The judges of the Tatabánya Tribunal, the Supreme Court and then those of the CURIA, having proceeded in the matter, are not aware of the EU law.
2. The courts having acted in the matter made intentionally judgments contrasting with the EU law.

With regard to the fact that the arbitrators and the ordinary courts having acted in the matter are capable to interpret the EU law in accordance with the genuine, valid contents thereof, according to the position taken by the Complainant infringement of the EU competition law has taken place intentionally considering the ambitious, untrue contents of the reasoning of the decisions. Complainant did not discover in the judgments the traits of negligence, with regard to the active, untrue constraint of reasoning.

As a further proof may we allege judgment No. 4. P23.616/2013/15 of the Metropolitan Tribunal (dated 5 November 2013), which we will forward in a scanned form as enclosure to this submission of ours.

It was characteristic for the proceedings of the Metropolitan Court that it denied examination of the infringements of the courts having proceeded prior to the Metropolitan Court, in the basic case, and CURIA accepted findings of the fundamental proceedings, in spite of all of our documentary evidences. E.g. in the second indent of page 27 of CURIA’s judgment it was laid down that the CURIA“ – as it appears from the reasoning – has taken into consideration, upon making its decisions, the provisions of Community law, and in the course of the application thereof it had no doubt regarding the contents of Community law.

It was also unambiguous before the Metropolitan Court (third indent of page 27 of its judgement) that Complainant “… did not indicate any fact, circumstance, legal reasoning of either in the issue of the law applied by the arbitration court, or within the scope of the infringement of the Community law, which would provide grounds for CURIA’s obvious and conspicuous infringement.”

The judgement of the Tribunal is qualified by the fact that it recognised itself (on page 30 of the judgement) that “the court considered the plaintiff’s claim… in the absence of any evident and conspicuous unlawfulness groundless without having examined, on the merits, the applicability to the issue subject to the lawsuit, that is, Article 81 of EC Treaty (Article 101 of TFEU). Initiation of preliminary ruling was therefore unnecessary from the aspect of adjudging the present case, therefore the court rejected the Plaintiff’s motion.”

Consequently, the Tribunal refused to examine the aspects of the EU competition law in the matter and, by the way, to examine any other evidenced infringement and it was able to find even in the absence of such examination that the Complainant’s claim is groundless.

The Tribunal consented unconditionally to the position taken by the CURIA, as court of higher instance, in the respect that “in this lawsuit the Tribunal it is unable to find that the contents of the non-appealable judgement passed in the fundamental proceedings, should be unlawful” (penultimate indent of page 26), although the Tribunal stated that “Legal opportunity may exist only in the event of obvious and conspicuous infringement.”

And then, in order to avoid finding this fact it refused examination of the proven infringing application of Article 101 of TFEU.

On the basis of the argumentation above the Legal Service can judge that the courts of the Member State wish to impede in any possible way that the case should come before the European Court of Justice, and, therefore, enforcement of the EU law would be assisted, if the Commission could pose questions to the Hungarian State regarding compliance, in this matter, with the EU competition law.

Complainant proves by the judgements of the European Court that here the case of the initiation of preliminary ruling is existing.

This obligation existed due to the fact that the courts of a Member State, judging at last resort, infringed all relevant provisions of the EU law and EU competition law.

In this case it can be unambiguously excluded that the proper application of the EU legal rules was obvious also for the court.

“The courts whose decisions may not be attacked by appeal according to the internal law, shall address the European Court for the interpretation of the issue arising before them, unless there is already an established case law or it seems obvious the correct application of a Community norm.”*

*Case Cilfit, judgment of 6 October 1982 (238/81)

5. THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY IS TO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A COURT OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER NATIONAL LAW IS REQUIRED, WHERE A QUESTION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS RAISED BEFORE IT, TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE, UNLESS IT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW IS SO OBVIOUS AS TO LEAVE NO SCOPE FOR ANY REASONABLE DOUBT. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A POSSIBILITY MUST BE ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY LAW, THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH ITS INTERPRETATION GIVES RISE AND THE RISK OF DIVERGENCES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY .

By the act of the arbitration court, and then by that of the court acting in the basic case of the Member State, and, finally, by that of the court proceeding the court proceeding at last resort of the Member State, refused in spite of our multiple claims, the application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, they discredited the validity of the Regulation. In order to consider invalid the EU law (which is proven by the intentional non-application of the Regulation), the preliminary ruling of the European Court would have been necessary for the court of a Member State. In spite thereof the court, acting at last resort, of the Member State refused reference for preliminary ruling in the issue of invalidity, and it has decided tacitly that in the present lawsuit concerning the EU competition law the Regulation 1/2003/EC should be considered invalid.

Regarding invalid the Regulation is also proven by the fact that no prescription of the Regulation has been complied with. Not even the provision that in the event of the EU competition law there is no exception from the prohibition of application of a law with retroactive effect. Namely, the court having acted at last resort accepted and reasoned unlawfully that the arbitration court had lawfully applied Article 81 of the European Commission for the period lasting from 15 September 2003 to 1 May 2004 (i.e. also for the period preceding the accession of Hungary).

“JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)

14 February 2012 

 

48      Regulation No 1/2003 contains procedural and substantive rules.

49      As the Advocate General has pointed out in point 43 of her Opinion, the said regulation, like Article 81 EC, contains substantive provisions which govern the assessment by the competition authorities of agreements between undertakings and therefore constitute substantive rules of EU law.

50      Such substantive rules cannot in principle be applied retroactively, irrespective of whether such application might produce favourable or unfavourable effects for the persons concerned. The principle of legal certainty requires that any factual situation should normally, in the absence of any express contrary provision, be examined in the light of the legal rules existing at the time when the situation obtained (see, to that effect, Case C‑120/08 Bavaria [22 December 2010] ECR I‑13393, paragraphs 40 and 41) [not yet published in EBHT].

51      According to settled case-law, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of Community law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it follows clearly from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect must be given to them (see Case C‑369/09 P ISD Polska and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I‑2011, paragraph 98 and case-law cited) [not yet published in EBHT].”

 

It was constituted in the case law of the European Court that should a decision on the validity of the Community law be necessary in a proceeding pending before the court of a Member State, then the court of the Member State may consider invalid an act of the Community on the basis of the preliminary ruling. The result of a solution contrasting thereto would be the assessment of the Community law differing from Member State to Member State.

In the case Foto-Frost [314/85 Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987.] it was held by the European Court that the courts of the Member States had made a discretionary decision on the issue whether they initiate proceeding for a preliminary ruling in the matter of the validity of the acts of the Community, at the same time they have no powers for declaring invalid the acts of the bodies of the Community, exclusively the European Court is authorised to state the invalidity of the acts of Community.

Furthermore, the European Court explained, in its resolution made in the case ICC [66/80 International Chemical Corporation v. Amministratione delle Finanze [1981.] E. C.R. page 1191] that should an act of the Community have been declared invalid, then the invalidity may be relied upon before other courts of the Member State and in other cases, too. Consequently, the invalidity may only be stated by the European Court.

I request the Honourable Legal Service to carry out the analysis of my complaint, taking into consideration of the actual contents and legal references of my present summarising submission and to institute the proceedings of infringement due to the refusal, by of the courts of the Hungarian Member State, of the application of the EU law, applicable directly and mandatorily.

 

Tata, email date 2013

 

Very truly yours: TÓTH István

 

 

I append in e-mail the judgment of the Metropolitan Tribunal.

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Oldal: 117.Angolul csak tudnak az UNIÓBAN! III.rész.
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